3 papers
econ.TH2026
Matching with Choice Correspondences: Persistence and Acyclicity
Varun Bansal, Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study stable matching when agents are described by choice correspondences rather than preferences. For many-to-many markets, we introduce individually rational persistence (IRP)…
econ.TH2026
Fair Division of a Heterogeneous Good Between Two Agents: An Ordinal Approach
Mihir Bhattacharya, Ojasvi Khare
We study the division of a heterogeneous good between two agents into contiguous bundles, each defined by a starting location and a quantity, in a purely ordinal framework that doe…
econ.TH2026
A simple characterization of single-peaked domains
Mihir Bhattacharya, Anup Pramanik
This paper characterizes the single-peaked domain on a tree via the strategy-proofness of extreme rules defined on that tree. For any tree, these rules are unanimous and anonymous…