20 citations · 27 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
Johannes Hörner, Paula Onuchic
We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge, who is privately and imperfectly informed about a state, must choose between two speakers of unknown reliability. E…
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
Optimally Dictatorial Committees
D. Carlos Akkar
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who ca…
Disclosure and Incentives in Teams
Paula Onuchic, João Ramos
We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational impli…
Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, s…
Recent Contributions to Theories of Discrimination
Paula Onuchic
This paper surveys the literature on theories of discrimination, focusing mainly on new contributions. Recent theories expand on the traditional taste-based and statistical discrim…
Conveying Value via Categories
Paula Onuchic, Debraj Ray
A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a…
Advisors with Hidden Motives
Paula Onuchic
I study a model of advisors with hidden motives: a seller discloses information about an object's value to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or how profitable…