7 papers
Communicating About Endogenous Issues
Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid
Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional dec…
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid, Denis Shishkin
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indiffere…
Predicting Choice from Information Costs
Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid
An agent acquires a costly flexible signal before making a decision. We explore to what degree knowledge of the agent's information costs helps predict her behavior. We establish a…
The Production and Consumption of Social Media
Apostolos Filippas, John Horton
We model social media as collections of users producing and consuming content. Users value consuming content, but doing so uses up their scarce attention, and hence they prefer con…
Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework
Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet, Dong Wei
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the princ…