3 papers
econ.TH2024
Designing Simple Mechanisms
Shengwu Li
Which mechanisms are simple to play? When is it easy for participants to see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible? I will start by explaining how and why economists came to ask…
econ.TH2022
Sequential Cursed Equilibrium
Shani Cohen, Shengwu Li
We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players that neglect information from hypothetical events, but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed…
cs.DS2021
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li +1
We study dynamic matching in a spatial setting. Drivers are distributed at random on some interval. Riders arrive in some (possibly adversarial) order at randomly drawn points. The…