14 citations · 20 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Designing Simple Mechanisms
Shengwu Li
Which mechanisms are simple to play? When is it easy for participants to see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible? I will start by explaining how and why economists came to ask…
Sequential Cursed Equilibrium
Shani Cohen, Shengwu Li
We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players that neglect information from hypothetical events, but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed…
A Theory of Ex Post Rationalization
Erik Eyster, Shengwu Li, Sarah Ridout
People rationalize their past choices, even those that were mistakes in hindsight. We propose a formal theory of this behavior. The theory predicts that sunk costs affect later cho…
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets
Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li +1
We study dynamic matching in a spatial setting. Drivers are distributed at random on some interval. Riders arrive in some (possibly adversarial) order at randomly drawn points. The…
On the Computational Properties of Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Louis Golowich, Shengwu Li
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
Dynamic Matching Market Design
Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, Shayan Oveis Gharan
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agent…