27 citations · 32 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
From No-Regret to Strategically Robust Learning in Repeated Auctions
Junyao Zhao
In Bayesian single-item auctions, a monotone bidding strategy--one that prescribes a higher bid for a higher value type--can be equivalently represented as a partition of the quant…
Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao
We study repeated first-price auctions and general repeated Bayesian games between two players, where one player, the learner, employs a no-regret learning algorithm, and the other…
The Power of Menus in Contract Design
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang +1
We study the power of menus of contracts in principal-agent problems with adverse selection (agents can be one of several types) and moral hazard (we cannot observe agent actions d…
Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World
Gagan Aggarwal, Andres Perlroth, Junyao Zhao
Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization g…
Beyond Worst-Case Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao
Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad…
The Randomized Communication Complexity of Randomized Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao
We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over item…
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…