activity
20202026
collaborators

22 papers

cs.GT2026

A Constant Metric Distortion Protocol for Approval Voting Given Plurality Polls

Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters

Approval voting is a simple and well-regarded voting rule: voters submit approval ballots (subsets of the candidates) and the candidate receiving the most approvals wins. One major…

cs.GT2026

A Polynomial-Time Rule Satisfying Full Justified Representation

Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters

In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters submit an approval ballot on which basis a committee of fixed size has to be selected. Compared to single-winner voting this makes…

cs.GT2026

Beyond Lower Quota: Avoiding Overrepresentation in Multi-Winner Voting

Anton Baychkov, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly +2

Recently, in the social choice literature, much attention has been given to the question of avoiding underrepresentation in approval-based multi-winner voting. In this paper, we ex…

cs.GT2026

Two Observations on Metric Distortion and Condorcet Winning Sets

Jannik Peters

In this research note we briefly connect two well-studied topics in computational social choice: metric distortion and the selection of undominated committees. In particular, we sh…

cs.GT2026

An Axiomatic Analysis of Proportionality Notions in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Chris Dong, Jannik Peters

Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for…

cs.GT2026

Explanation Systems for Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Niclas Boehmer, Luca Kreisel, Jannik Peters

In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range…