6 citations · 19 across the 22 of their papers we have counts for
28 papers
A Constant Metric Distortion Protocol for Approval Voting Given Plurality Polls
Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters
Approval voting is a simple and well-regarded voting rule: voters submit approval ballots (subsets of the candidates) and the candidate receiving the most approvals wins. One major…
A Polynomial-Time Rule Satisfying Full Justified Representation
Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters submit an approval ballot on which basis a committee of fixed size has to be selected. Compared to single-winner voting this makes…
Beyond Lower Quota: Avoiding Overrepresentation in Multi-Winner Voting
Anton Baychkov, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly +2
Recently, in the social choice literature, much attention has been given to the question of avoiding underrepresentation in approval-based multi-winner voting. In this paper, we ex…
Two Observations on Metric Distortion and Condorcet Winning Sets
Jannik Peters
In this research note we briefly connect two well-studied topics in computational social choice: metric distortion and the selection of undominated committees. In particular, we sh…
An Axiomatic Analysis of Proportionality Notions in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
Chris Dong, Jannik Peters
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for…
Explanation Systems for Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
Niclas Boehmer, Luca Kreisel, Jannik Peters
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range…
Utilitarian Guarantees for the Method of Equal Shares
Anton Baychkov, Markus Brill, Jannik Peters
In recent years, research in Participatory Budgeting (PB) has put a greater emphasis on rules satisfying notions of fairness and proportionality, with the Method of Equal Shares (M…
Proportionality in Practice: Quantifying Proportionality in Ordinal Elections
Tuva Bardal, Markus Brill, David McCune +1
Proportional representation plays a crucial role in electoral systems. In ordinal elections, where voters rank candidates based on their preferences, the Single Transferable Vote (…
Reconfiguring Proportional Committees
Chris Dong, Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters +1
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees,…
Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters +1
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate…
Quantifying Core Stability Relaxations in Hedonic Games
Tom Demeulemeester, Jannik Peters
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly…
Candidate Monotonicity and Proportionality for Lotteries and Non-Resolute Rules
Jannik Peters
We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of…
Margin of Victory for Weighted Tournament Solutions
Michelle Döring, Jannik Peters
Determining how close a winner of an election is to becoming a loser, or distinguishing between different possible winners of an election, are major problems in computational socia…
Can a Few Decide for Many? The Metric Distortion of Sortition
Ioannis Caragiannis, Evi Micha, Jannik Peters
Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect th…
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters +2
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compat…
Completing Priceable Committees: Utilitarian and Representation Guarantees for Proportional Multiwinner Voting
Markus Brill, Jannik Peters
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum…
Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspective
Leon Kellerhals, Jannik Peters
We study the proportional clustering problem of Chen et al. [ICML'19] and relate it to the area of multiwinner voting in computational social choice. We show that any clustering sa…
A Note on Rules Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion
Jannik Peters
In this note, we uncover three connections between the metric distortion problem and voting methods and axioms from the social choice literature.
Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting
Markus Brill, Jannik Peters
When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simpli…
Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting
Markus Brill, Stefan Forster, Martin Lackner +2
The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections.…
Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods
Xinhang Lu, Jannik Peters, Haris Aziz +2
We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of mu…
Online Elicitation of Necessarily Optimal Matchings
Jannik Peters
In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting preferences of agents in the house allocation model. For this we build on a recent model of Hosseini et al.[AAAI'21] and focus on t…
Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting
Markus Brill, Jonas Israel, Evi Micha +1
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existi…
Pareto optimal and popular house allocation with lower and upper quotas
Ágnes Cseh, Tobias Friedrich, Jannik Peters
In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the…