3 citations · 5 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Playing the system: address manipulation and access to schools
Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, Lykke Sterll Christensen, Mikkel Høst Gandil +1
Strategic incentives may lead to inefficient and unequal provision of public services. A prominent example is school admissions. Existing research shows that applicants "play the s…
Why Do Students Lie and Should We Worry? An Analysis of Non-truthful Reporting
Emil Chrisander, Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen
A core aspect in market design is to encourage participants to truthfully report their preferences to ensure efficiency and fairness. Our research paper analyzes the factors that c…
Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties
Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, Emil Chrisander
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for…