3 papers
econ.TH2026
On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions
Kiho Yoon
We study optimal auction design when the direction of bidders' deviations is restricted. We show that the optimal revenue when bidders can only underbid their true values cannot ex…
econ.TH2026
Demand reduction and initial endowments in consignment auctions
Kiho Yoon
Consignment auctions, in which bidders first receive free initial endowments of a good and must then consign them to a subsequent uniform price auction, are often used in emissions…
econ.TH2024
Optimal selling time with evolving private information
Kiho Yoon
We study the problem of when to sell one indivisible object to a buyer whose value from immediate allocation follows a privately observed Markov process. Incomplete information tra…