5 papers
Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders
Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely stud…
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
Shih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model…
On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
Shih-Tang Su, David Kempe, Vijay G. Subramanian
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in t…
Social Learning with Questions
Grant Schoenebeck, Shih-Tang Su, Vijay Subramanian
This work studies sequential social learning (also known as Bayesian observational learning), and how private communication can enable agents to avoid herding to the wrong action/s…
A Descending Price Auction for Matching Markets
Shih-Tang Su, Jacob D. Abernethy, Grant Schoenebeck +1
This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum market-clearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the comb…