11 citations · 30 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Robust forecast aggregation via additional queries
Rafael Frongillo, Mary Monroe, Eric Neyman +1
We study the problem of robust forecast aggregation: combining expert forecasts with provable accuracy guarantees compared to the best possible aggregation of the underlying inform…
Formalizing the presumption of independence
Paul Christiano, Eric Neyman, Mark Xu
Mathematical proof aims to deliver confident conclusions, but a very similar process of deduction can be used to make uncertain estimates that are open to revision. A key ingredien…
No-Regret Learning with Unbounded Losses: The Case of Logarithmic Pooling
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
For each of time steps, experts report probability distributions over outcomes; we wish to learn to aggregate these forecasts in a way that attains a no-regret guarante…
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals
Rafael Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
Inspired by Aumann's agreement theorem, Scott Aaronson studied the amount of communication necessary for two Bayesian experts to approximately agree on the expectation of a random…
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
The problem of aggregating expert forecasts is ubiquitous in fields as wide-ranging as machine learning, economics, climate science, and national security. Despite this, our theore…
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
We consider mechanisms for truthfully eliciting probabilistic predictions from a group of experts. The standard approach -- using a proper scoring rule to separately reward each ex…
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
This paper forges a strong connection between two seemingly unrelated forecasting problems: incentive-compatible forecast elicitation and forecast aggregation. Proper scoring rules…
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
All proper scoring rules incentivize an expert to predict \emph{accurately} (report their true estimate), but not all proper scoring rules equally incentivize \emph{precision}. Rat…
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman +2
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with items and two subadditive bidders. A -approximation can be guaranteed…
Anomalous Primes and the Elliptic Korselt Criterion
Liljana Babinkostova, Jackson C. Bahr, Yujin Kim +2
We explore the relationship between elliptic Korselt numbers of Type I, a class of pseudoprimes introduced by Silverman in [20], and anomalous primes. We generalize a result in [20…
Cylindric Young Tableaux and their Properties
Eric Neyman
Cylindric Young tableaux are combinatorial objects that first appeared in the 1990s. A natural extension of the classical notion of a Young tableau, they have since been used sever…