activity
20182026
most citedStable Matching with Mistaken Agents

18 citations · 43 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

econ.TH2026

First They Came for the Others: A Theory of Divide-and-Conquer

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinyuqi Huang, Wooyoung Lim

Divide-and-conquer tactics often succeed not through mechanical coordination failures, but through inferential friction regarding an aggressor's underlying intent. When an attacker…

econ.TH2026

Learning Against Nature: Minimax Regret and the Price of Robustness

Yeon-Koo Che, Longjian Li, Tianling Luo

We study how a decision-maker (DM) learns from data of unknown quality to form robust, ''general-purpose'' posterior beliefs. We develop a framework for robust learning and belief…

econ.TH2024★ 5 cited

Data-Driven Monitoring and Deterrence in a Changing Environment

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff

We study a dynamic model in which a principal monitors agents based on historical data of infractions. This data informs when and at what intensity to monitor; the monitoring decis…

econ.TH2023

Optimal Queue Design

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux

We study the optimal method for rationing scarce resources through a queue system. The designer controls agents' entry into a queue and their exit, their service priority -- or que…

econ.TH2022★ 5 cited

Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity

Sarah Auster, Yeon-Koo Che, Konrad Mierendorff

This paper studies sequential information acquisition by an ambiguity-averse decision maker (DM), who decides how long to collect information before taking an irreversible action.…

econ.TH2022★ 18 cited

Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents

Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically…

econ.TH2021★ 1 cited

Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods

Yeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distribution…

econ.TH2020

"Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima +1

We characterize Pareto optimality via "near" weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite seq…

q-fin.GN2020

Bailout Stigma

Yeon-Koo Che, Chongwoo Choe, Keeyoung Rhee

We develop a model of bailout stigma where accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and worsens its funding prospect. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms either…

cs.GT2020★ 4 cited

Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets

Yeon-Koo Che, Kyungmin Kim, Weijie Zhong

We study statistical discrimination of individuals based on payoff-irrelevant social identities in markets that utilize ratings and recommendations for social learning. Even though…

econ.TH2020★ 10 cited

Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

Yeon-Koo Che, Kyungmin Kim, Konrad Mierendorff

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can…

econ.TH2019

Monotone Comparative Statics without Lattices

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima

The theory of Monotone Comparative Statics (MCS) has traditionally required a lattice structure, excluding certain multidimensional environments such as mixed-strategy games where…

math.OC2018

Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention

Yeon-Koo Che, Konrad Mierendorff

We consider a decision maker (DM) who, before taking an action, seeks information by allocating her limited attention dynamically over different news sources that are biased toward…