6 citations · 15 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers · 1 filter
Minimally rational reallocation of objects
Özgün Ekici, M. Bumin Yenmez
Matching theory has largely evolved around two canonical rules: deferred acceptance (DA) in the marriage problem and top trading cycles (TTC) in the object reallocation problem. Al…
Priority Blockers: Welfare and Incentives in Matching under General Constraints
Lars Ehlers, M. Bumin Yenmez
Institutions often face constraints richer than a single capacity. Protecting the priority of a student who cannot be accommodated may then block a lower-priority student who fits.…
Diversity as Majorization
Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen, M. Bumin Yenmez
How should institutions compare group diversity, and which group should they select when they value diversity and merit? We take a target-based approach that evaluates the entire g…
Acceptant Expansions of Path-Independent Choice Rules
Christopher P. Chambers, M. Bumin Yenmez
A choice rule is -acceptant if it chooses alternatives from each set . We show that a path-independent rule of maximum cardinality at most need not have a…
Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem
Özgün Ekici, Sinan Ertemel, M. Bumin Yenmez
We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not…
Distributional Preferences for Market Design
Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen, M. Bumin Yenmez
Institutions selecting students, employees, or members value both about who is selected and the resulting group's composition. We study ``distributional'' preferences over group co…