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cs.GT2022★ 1 cited
Equilibria in Repeated Games under No-Regret with Dynamic Benchmarks
Ludovico Crippa, Yonatan Gur, Bar Light
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \…
cs.GT2022
Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence
Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light +2
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly u…