36 citations · 59 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Hamiltonian of polymatrix zero-sum games
Toshihiro Ota, Yuma Fujimoto
The understanding of a dynamical system's properties can be significantly advanced by establishing it as a Hamiltonian system and then systematically exploring its inherent symmetr…
Time-Varyingness in Auction Breaks Revenue Equivalence
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
Auction is applied for trade with various mechanisms. A simple but practical question is which mechanism, typically first-price or second-price auctions, is preferred from the pers…
Synchronization in Learning in Periodic Zero-Sum Games Triggers Divergence from Nash Equilibrium
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around…
Global Behavior of Learning Dynamics in Zero-Sum Games with Memory Asymmetry
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
This study examines the global behavior of dynamics in learning in games between two players, X and Y. We consider the simplest situation for memory asymmetry between two players:…
Nash Equilibrium and Learning Dynamics in Three-Player Matching -Action Games
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players i…
Memory Asymmetry Creates Heteroclinic Orbits to Nash Equilibrium in Learning in Zero-Sum Games
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history…
Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
Yuma Fujimoto, Hisashi Ohtsuki
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with…
Learning in Multi-Memory Games Triggers Complex Dynamics Diverging from Nash Equilibrium
Yuma Fujimoto, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe
Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex.…