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20112026
most citedPAC-Bayes-Bernstein Inequality for Martingales and its Application to Multiarmed Bandits

13 citations · 67 across the 44 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2025

Online Budget Allocation with Censored Semi-Bandit Feedback

François Bachoc, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari +1

We study a stochastic budget-allocation problem over tasks. At each round , the learner chooses an allocation . Task succeeds with probability $F_k(X_{t,k})…

cs.GT2024

Market Making without Regret

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2

We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round , a market maker posts a bid price and an ask price to an incoming trader (the taker) with a p…

cs.GT2024

Fair Online Bilateral Trade

François Bachoc, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari +1

In online bilateral trade, a platform posts prices to incoming pairs of buyers and sellers that have private valuations for a certain good. If the price is lower than the buyers' v…

cs.GT2023★ 6 cited

The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our ma…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Online Learning in Supply-Chain Games

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Takayuki Osogami +2

We study a repeated game between a supplier and a retailer who want to maximize their respective profits without full knowledge of the problem parameters. After characterizing the…

cs.GT2021

Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspective

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2

Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they h…

cs.GT2021

Finding Stable Matchings in PhD Markets with Consistent Preferences and Cooperative Partners

Maximilian Mordig, Riccardo Della Vecchia, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi +1

We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can…