3 citations · 7 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Lies, Labels, and Mechanisms
Alex L. Brown, Ethan Park, Rodrigo A. Velez
We test whether lying aversion can steer equilibrium selection in mechanism design. In a principal-worker environment, the direct mechanism admits two dominant-strategy equilibria:…
Empirical strategy-proofness
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduce…
Empirical bias of extreme-price auctions: analysis
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a com…
The paradox of monotone structural QRE
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)'s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.
Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence
Alexander L. Brown, Rodrigo A. Velez
We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid, average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. The analysis of these auctions b…
Empirical Equilibrium
Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in gam…