activity
20182026
most citedPAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication

34 citations · 44 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

14 papers

cs.CR2026

PRISM: Lightweight Enclave Isolation with Prismatic Capabilities

Merve Gülmez, Adam Caulfield, Hakan Englund +2

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) protect sensitive code and data from external interference, but lack inherent memory safety. CHERI can enforce spatial memory safety at the ob…

cs.CR2026

FRESCO: Complete and Scalable Temporal Safety for CHERI Application Processors

Merve Gülmez, Nils Jordan, Jialun Zhang +4

CHERI provides hardware-enforced spatial memory safety. While prior work extends it with heap temporal safety, stack use-after-return remains unaddressed. Existing defenses fall sh…

cs.CR2026

PICASSO: Scaling CHERI Use-After-Free Protection to Millions of Allocations using Colored Capabilities

Merve Gülmez, Ruben Sturm, Hossam ElAtali +4

While the CHERI instruction-set architecture extensions for capabilities enable strong spatial memory safety, CHERI lacks built-in temporal safety, particularly for heap allocation…

cs.CR2025

BLACKOUT: Data-Oblivious Computation with Blinded Capabilities

Hossam ElAtali, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1

Lack of memory-safety and exposure to side channels are two prominent, persistent challenges for the secure implementation of software. Memory-safe programming languages promise to…

cs.CR2024

BliMe Linter

Hossam ElAtali, Xiaohe Duan, Hans Liljestrand +2

Outsourced computation presents a risk to the confidentiality of clients' sensitive data since they have to trust that the service providers will not mishandle this data. Blinded M…

cs.CR2024

CacheSquash: Making caches speculation-aware

Hossam ElAtali, N. Asokan

Speculation is key to achieving high CPU performance, yet it enables risks like Spectre attacks which remain a significant challenge to mitigate without incurring substantial perfo…

cs.CR2024

Data-Oblivious ML Accelerators using Hardware Security Extensions

Hossam ElAtali, John Z. Jekel, Lachlan J. Gunn +1

Outsourced computation can put client data confidentiality at risk. Existing solutions are either inefficient or insufficiently secure: cryptographic techniques like fully-homomorp…

cs.CR2022

Towards cryptographically-authenticated in-memory data structures

Setareh Ghorshi, Lachlan J. Gunn, Hans Liljestrand +1

Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate dat…

cs.CR2022★ 5 cited

BliMe: Verifiably Secure Outsourced Computation with Hardware-Enforced Taint Tracking

Hossam ElAtali, Lachlan J. Gunn, Hans Liljestrand +1

Outsourced computing is widely used today. However, current approaches for protecting client data in outsourced computing fall short: use of cryptographic techniques like fully-hom…

cs.CR2022★ 2 cited

Color My World: Deterministic Tagging for Memory Safety

Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea, Rémi Denis-Courmont +2

Hardware-assisted memory protection features are increasingly being deployed in COTS processors. ARMv8.5 Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE) is a recent example, which has been used to…

cs.CR2019

Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2

Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…

cs.CR2019★ 1 cited

PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack

Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2

A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…

cs.CR2019★ 2 cited

Exploitation Techniques and Defenses for Data-Oriented Attacks

Long Cheng, Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman +4

Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause s…

cs.CR2018★ 34 cited

PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication

Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3

Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…