5 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.EM2019
Discerning Solution Concepts
Nail Kashaev, Bruno Salcedo
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right s…
econ.TH2019★ 1 cited
Persuading part of an audience
Bruno Salcedo
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade…
cs.GT2013★ 5 cited
Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments
Bruno Salcedo
Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions ta…