activity
20192024
most citedDelegation in Veto Bargaining

15 citations · 19 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

math.NA2024

Entropy-Regularized Optimal Transport in Information Design

Jorge Justiniano, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu +2

In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular…

econ.TH2024

The Extreme Points of Fusions

Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack +1

Our work explores fusions, the multidimensional counterparts of mean-preserving contractions and their extreme and exposed points. We reveal an elegant geometric/combinatorial stru…

econ.TH2022

Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World

Andreas Kleiner

We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state. We provide necessary and su…

econ.TH2022★ 4 cited

Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information

S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner

We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The pro…

econ.TH2020★ 15 cited

Delegation in Veto Bargaining

Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner, Richard Van Weelden

A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optim…

econ.TH2019

Costly Verification in Collective Decisions

Albin Erlanson, Andreas Kleiner

We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by ag…