10 citations · 10 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2023
Regret-Minimizing Project Choice
Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya
An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism…
econ.TH2020
Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
Egor Starkov
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria wi…
econ.TH2019★ 10 cited
Robust Monopoly Regulation
Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where the regret is the dif…