4 citations · 5 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Competitive Many-to-One Matching: Sorting vs. Equality
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We study many-to-one matching with transfers and peer effects, such as matching workers to firms, students to schools, residents to neighborhoods, or consumers to status goods. Wit…
Marginal Reputation
Daniel Luo, Alexander Wolitzky
We study reputation formation where a long-run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short-run players observe the long-run player's past actions but not he…
Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We offer a simple analysis of the problem of choosing a statistical experiment to optimize the induced distribution of posterior medians, or more generally -quantiles for any $q…
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in e…
The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
Anton Kolotilin, Alexander Wolitzky
We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts so as to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate u…
Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences
Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao, Alexander Wolitzky
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approac…
Simple Records Support Robust Indirect Reciprocity
Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Wolitzky
Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: image scoring models fai…