3 citations · 3 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Metric Distortion of Social Welfare Functions
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, Aaryaman Aggarwal, Evi Micha
Metric distortion has primarily been studied for social choice functions, which select a single winner from ordinal preferences. We extend this framework to social welfare function…
-Approval Veto: A Spectrum of Voting Rules Balancing Metric Distortion and Minority Protection
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe
In the context of single-winner ranked-choice elections between candidates, we explore the tradeoff between two competing goals in every democratic system: the majority princip…
Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric Distortion
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called…
Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voti…
On Hedonic Games with Common Ranking Property
Bugra Caskurlu, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
Hedonic games are a prominent model of coalition formation, in which each agent's utility only depends on the coalition she resides. The subclass of hedonic games that models the f…
On Singleton Congestion Games with Resilience Against Collusion
Bugra Caskurlu, Ozgun Ekici, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games with identical and increasing cost functions, i.e., each agent tries to utilize from the least crowded resource in her accessibl…