5 papers
Pair rationality and top trading cycles on single-peaked and single-dipped domains
Özgün Ekici, M. Bumin Yenmez
In a recent study, Ekici and Yenmez (2026) characterize top trading cycles (TTC) on the unrestricted domain by strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and pair rationality, unc…
Minimally rational reallocation of objects
Özgün Ekici, M. Bumin Yenmez
Matching theory has largely evolved around two canonical rules: deferred acceptance (DA) in the marriage problem and top trading cycles (TTC) in the object reallocation problem. Al…
Rawlsian equity: a new notion of fairness for the assignment problem
Özgün Ekici, Sinan Ertemel, M. Bumin Yenmez
We introduce Rawlsian equity, a notion of fairness for allocating indivisible objects among agents without object-specific entitlements. Rawlsian equity requires that an object not…
On Singleton Congestion Games with Resilience Against Collusion
Bugra Caskurlu, Ozgun Ekici, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games with identical and increasing cost functions, i.e., each agent tries to utilize from the least crowded resource in her accessibl…
On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures
Bugra Caskurlu, Ozgun Ekici, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. W…