13 citations · 36 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Deterministic implementation in single-item auctions
Yan Liu, Zeyu Ren, Pingzhong Tang +3
Deterministic auctions are attractive in practice due to their transparency, simplicity, and ease of implementation, motivating a sharper understanding of when they can attain the…
The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance
Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo
We study the computation contests where players compete for searching a solution to a given problem with a winner-take-all reward. The search processes are independent across the p…
How to manipulate truthful prior-dependent mechanisms?
Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng
In the standard formulation of mechanism design, a key assumption is that the designer has reliable information and technology to determine a prior distribution on types of the age…
Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen +1
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equili…