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cs.GT2025
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains fr…
cs.GT2025
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for…