7 citations · 11 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains fr…
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for…
Incentive Compatible Active Learning
Federico Echenique, Siddharth Prasad
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the paramet…
Learning Time Dependent Choice
Zachary Chase, Siddharth Prasad
We explore questions dealing with the learnability of models of choice over time. We present a large class of preference models defined by a structural criterion for which we are a…