7 citations · 16 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Auctions with Price Predictions
Muthu Sundar, Alec Sun, Siddharth Prasad +1
We design auctions for the sale of a single item with unlimited supply given a single prediction of the revenue-maximizing uniform price. This departs from prior work on auctions w…
Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains fr…
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for…
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm
We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. S…
Incentive Compatible Active Learning
Federico Echenique, Siddharth Prasad
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the paramet…
Learning Time Dependent Choice
Zachary Chase, Siddharth Prasad
We explore questions dealing with the learnability of models of choice over time. We present a large class of preference models defined by a structural criterion for which we are a…