activity
20192026
most citedRegularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games

2 citations · 2 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

10 papers

econ.TH2026

The Expected Number of Pairwise Stable Networks

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Christian Seel, Arkadi Predtetchinski

This paper studies probabilistic properties of pairwise stability for a network model where individual utilities are random variables. We study the probability that a given network…

math.OC2026

Optimal strategies in Markov decision processes with finitely additive evaluations

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D Sudderth +1

We study infinite-horizon Markov decision processes (MDPs) where the decision maker evaluates each of her strategies by aggregating the infinite stream of expected stage-rewards. T…

math.PR2024

Approximations of expectations under infinite product measures

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

We are given a bounded Borel-measurable real-valued function on a product of countably many Polish spaces, and a product probability measure. We are interested in points in the pro…

math.OC2024

Zero-one Laws for a Control Problem with Random Action Sets

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D Sudderth +1

In many control problems there is only limited information about the actions that will be available at future stages. We introduce a framework where the Controller chooses actions…

math.OC2022★ 2 cited

Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

A real-valued function that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is \emph{regular} if for every Borel set , is the supremum of , over all close…

math.OC2021

Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Janos Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1

We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an -equilibrium, for every .