2 citations · 3 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
Giulio Salizzoni, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb +2
While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this se…
Games with infinite past
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Eilon Solan
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers . We define two re…
Simultaneous Best-Response Dynamics in Random Potential Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb
This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games w…
A Taste for Variety
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos, Ehud Lehrer
A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency…
Approximations of expectations under infinite product measures
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1
We are given a bounded Borel-measurable real-valued function on a product of countably many Polish spaces, and a product probability measure. We are interested in points in the pro…
Markovian Persuasion with Two States
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Penélope Hernández, Zvika Neeman +1
This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the…
Absorbing Blackwell Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Eilon Solan
It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $…
Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1
A real-valued function that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is \emph{regular} if for every Borel set , is the supremum of , over all close…
Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Janos Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1
We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an -equilibrium, for every .
I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Yannick Viossat
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new informat…
Granular DeGroot Dynamics -- a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks
Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan +1
We study a model of opinion exchange in social networks where a state of the world is realized and every agent receives a zero-mean noisy signal of the realized state. It is known…
Absorption Paths and Equilibria in Quitting Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ilia Krasikov, Catherine Rainer +1
We study quitting games and define the concept of absorption paths, which is an alternative definition to strategy profiles that accomodates both discrete time aspects and continuo…
Reachability and safety objectives in Markov decision processes on long but finite horizons
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski +1
We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes in which the decision maker is interested in long but finite horizons. First we consider reachability objective: the decision ma…
Characterizing the Value Functions of Polynomial Games
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Eilon Solan, Anna Zseleva
We provide a characterization of the set of real-valued functions that can be the value function of some polynomial game. Specifically, we prove that a function $u : \dR \to \dR$ i…
Solving Two-State Markov Games with Incomplete Information on One Side *
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Catherine Rainer, Eilon Solan
We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value…