68 citations · 139 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs
Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee, Wing Suen
We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are st…
How Wasteful is Signaling?
Alex Frankel, Navin Kartik
Signaling is wasteful. But how wasteful? We study the fraction of surplus dissipated in a separating equilibrium. For isoelastic environments, this waste ratio has a simple formula…
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
Convex Choice
Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sens…
Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond
Navin Kartik, Francesco Squintani, Katrin Tinn
Do elections aggregate the private information of office-motivated candidates? Our answer stems from a general result for two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independe…
Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection
Navin Kartik, Weijie Zhong
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simp…
Test-Optional Admissions
Wouter Dessein, Alex Frankel, Navin Kartik
Many U.S. colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say with more d…
Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments
Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, Daniel Rappoport
An agent's preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These inc…
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information
S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner
We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single-peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The pro…
Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning
Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, Tianhao Liu +1
When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a…
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner, Richard Van Weelden
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optim…
Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
Navin Kartik, Frances Lee, Wing Suen
We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP). Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects…
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
S. Nageeb Ali, Greg Lewis, Shoshana Vasserman
Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access th…
Improving Information from Manipulable Data
Alex Frankel, Navin Kartik
Data-based decisionmaking must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a framewo…