4 papers
Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs
Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee, Wing Suen
We study voluntary disclosure with multiple biased senders who may bear costs for disclosing or concealing their private information. Under relevant assumptions, disclosures are st…
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing
S. Nageeb Ali, Greg Lewis, Shoshana Vasserman
Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access th…