most citedAn Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Memory Bus

1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing cs.CRShow all

2 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2025

Securing DRAM at Scale: ARFM-Driven Row Hammer Defense with Unveiling the Threat of Short tRC Patterns

Nogeun Joo, Donghyuk Kim, Hyunjun Cho +3

To address the issue of powerful row hammer (RH) attacks, our study involved an extensive analysis of the prevalent attack patterns in the field. We discovered a strong correlation…

cs.CR2019★ 1 cited

An Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Memory Bus

Dayeol Lee, Dongha Jung, Ian T. Fang +2

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical…