34 citations · 63 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Extending Layered Attestation into ARM Application Run-Times
Antonio Joia Neto, Bilel Sefsaf, Norrathep Rattanavipanon +5
Modern mobile and edge platforms provide hardware-backed attestation of application and platform integrity at load-time. However, they offer little support once application executi…
BliMe Linter
Hossam ElAtali, Xiaohe Duan, Hans Liljestrand +2
Outsourced computation presents a risk to the confidentiality of clients' sensitive data since they have to trust that the service providers will not mishandle this data. Blinded M…
EC-CFI: Control-Flow Integrity via Code Encryption Counteracting Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Salmin Sultana, Hans Liljestrand +5
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escape…
Towards cryptographically-authenticated in-memory data structures
Setareh Ghorshi, Lachlan J. Gunn, Hans Liljestrand +1
Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate dat…
BliMe: Verifiably Secure Outsourced Computation with Hardware-Enforced Taint Tracking
Hossam ElAtali, Lachlan J. Gunn, Hans Liljestrand +1
Outsourced computing is widely used today. However, current approaches for protecting client data in outsourced computing fall short: use of cryptographic techniques like fully-hom…
Color My World: Deterministic Tagging for Memory Safety
Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea, Rémi Denis-Courmont +2
Hardware-assisted memory protection features are increasingly being deployed in COTS processors. ARMv8.5 Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE) is a recent example, which has been used to…
Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel
Rémi Denis-Courmont, Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea +1
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse gr…
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…
PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…
Exploitation Techniques and Defenses for Data-Oriented Attacks
Long Cheng, Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman +4
Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause s…
PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3
Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…
Mitigating Branch-Shadowing Attacks on Intel SGX using Control Flow Randomization
Shohreh Hosseinzadeh, Hans Liljestrand, Ville Leppänen +1
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent r…
Towards Linux Kernel Memory Safety
Elena Reshetova, Hans Liljestrand, Andrew Paverd +1
The security of billions of devices worldwide depends on the security and robustness of the mainline Linux kernel. However, the increasing number of kernel-specific vulnerabilities…
STASH: Securing transparent authentication schemes using prover-side proximity verification
Mika Juuti, Christian Vaas, Ivo Sluganovic +3
Transparent authentication (TA) schemes are those in which a user is authenticated by a verifier without requiring explicit user interaction. By doing so, those schemes promise hig…