2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Towards cryptographically-authenticated in-memory data structures
Setareh Ghorshi, Lachlan J. Gunn, Hans Liljestrand +1
Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate dat…
Camouflage: Hardware-assisted CFI for the ARM Linux kernel
Rémi Denis-Courmont, Hans Liljestrand, Carlos Chinea +1
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse gr…
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman +2
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcin…
PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Lachlan J. Gunn +2
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven…
Exploitation Techniques and Defenses for Data-Oriented Attacks
Long Cheng, Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman +4
Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause s…
PAC it up: Towards Pointer Integrity using ARM Pointer Authentication
Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Kui Wang +3
Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques…