3 papers
cs.GT2021
Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design
Yihang Hu, Zhiyi Huang, Yiheng Shen +1
This paper introduces the targeted sampling model in optimal auction design. In this model, the seller may specify a quantile interval and sample from a buyer's prior restricted to…
cs.GT2019
Algorithmic Price Discrimination
Rachel Cummings, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design…
cs.GT2018
Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders
Zhiyi Huang, Jinyan Liu, Xiangning Wang
We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the s…