9 citations · 11 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Teams with a Constant Degree of Selfishness
David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin, Kangning Wang
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winn…
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [Am…
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including o…
Multi-Parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximizat…
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin +1
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer has a private value for receiving the s…
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas +1
The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bou…