2 citations · 2 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Minimizing Volatility: Optimal Adjustment with Evolving Feasibility Constraints
Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1
Minimizing volatility and adjustment costs is of central importance in many economic environments, yet it is often complicated by evolving feasibility constraints. We study a decis…
Avoiding the Worst: The Computational Complexity of Not Worst-Responding
Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock +3
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of pure Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given the others' actions, are known to be computationally intractable pr…
Correlation of Rankings in Matching Markets
Rémi Castera, Patrick Loiseau, Bary S. R. Pradelski
We study the role of correlation in matching markets, where multiple decision-makers simultaneously face selection problems from the same pool of candidates. We propose a model in…
Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness
Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos +2
Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine le…
On the existence of pure epsilon-equilibria
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
Departing from optimizing behavior by any ensures the existence of stable outcomes in a broad class of many-agent games where utilities are drawn from a joint distribution. S…
No-regret learning in harmonic games: Extrapolation in the face of conflicting interests
Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Christos H. Papadimitriou +2
The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By…
Bridging the Gap Between Central and Local Decision-Making: The Efficacy of Collaborative Equilibria in Altruistic Congestion Games
Bryce L Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S R Pradelski +1
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that al…
Satisficing Equilibrium
Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent plays one of her top actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and…
A geometric decomposition of finite games: Convergence vs. recurrence under exponential weights
Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Bary Pradelski
In view of the complexity of the dynamics of learning in games, we seek to decompose a game into simpler components where the dynamics' long-run behavior is well understood. A natu…
Equitable Auctions
Simon Finster, Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras +2
We study how auction design shapes surplus division among bidders. We introduce a parsimonious ex post equity notion and examine standard multi-unit auctions. The equity-optimal pr…
Collaborative Decision-Making and the k-Strong Price of Anarchy in Common Interest Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1
The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation tec…
Collaborative Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems: Quantifying the Strong Price of Anarchy for Resource Allocation Games
Bryce L. Ferguson, Dario Paccagnan, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborativ…
Selection in the Presence of Implicit Bias: The Advantage of Intersectional Constraints
Anay Mehrotra, Bary S. R. Pradelski, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
In selection processes such as hiring, promotion, and college admissions, implicit bias toward socially-salient attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation of candidates…
Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social p…