3 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala +1
We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to buyers with independent private values…
Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi +2
We consider the problem of selling perishable items to a stream of buyers in order to maximize social welfare. A seller starts with a set of identical items, and each arriving buye…
Two-sided Facility Location
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi +2
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediat…