5 citations · 10 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implement…
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result gener…
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions a…
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships.…
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable ma…
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of s…
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market
Noelia Juarez, Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuiti…
On the many-to-one strongly stable fractional matching set
Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and -responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings…