1 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result gener…
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships.…
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market
Noelia Juarez, Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuiti…
On the many-to-one strongly stable fractional matching set
Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and -responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings…