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20192026
most citedCycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings

5 citations · 10 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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econ.TH2024

Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments

Nadia Guiñazú, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We f…

econ.TH2024

Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models

Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1

This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of…

econ.TH2024

Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem

Adriana Amieva, Agustín G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme

We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we invest…

econ.TH2024

A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market

Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market.…

econ.TH2024

Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez +2

We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it?…