activity
20192026
most citedCycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings

5 citations · 10 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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17 papers · 1 filter

econ.TH2026

A polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings

Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2

We provide the first polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings in the classical one-to-one matching model. By modifying the classical stability constraints, we i…

econ.TH2026

A characterization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in matching markets

Lucero Quevedo Mauricio, Paola Manasero, Pablo Neme +1

This paper studies the structure and computation of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in one-to-one matching markets. While pairwise stability and corewise stability coinci…

econ.TH2026

Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts

Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2

We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define p…

econ.TH2026

Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Pablo Neme

We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cove…

econ.TH2025

Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena, Pablo Neme

We study coalition formation problems in the presence of externalities, focusing on settings where agents exhibit myopic expectations, that is, they evaluate potential deviations b…

econ.TH2024

Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments

Nadia Guiñazú, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We f…

econ.TH2024

Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models

Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1

This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of…

econ.TH2024

Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem

Adriana Amieva, Agustín G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme

We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we invest…

econ.TH2024

A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market

Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choice functions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associated one-to-one market.…

econ.TH2024

Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez +2

We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it?…

econ.TH2022★ 1 cited

The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2

We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions a…

econ.TH2022★ 1 cited

Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences

Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1

In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships.…

econ.TH2021★ 5 cited

Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1

In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable ma…

econ.TH2021

The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2

In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of s…

econ.TH2020★ 1 cited

A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

Agustin G. Bonifacio, Elena Inarra, Pablo Neme

Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process…

econ.TH2020★ 1 cited

Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market

Noelia Juarez, Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo

For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuiti…

econ.TH2019★ 1 cited

On the many-to-one strongly stable fractional matching set

Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo

For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and -responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings…