5 citations · 8 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
A polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We provide the first polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings in the classical one-to-one matching model. By modifying the classical stability constraints, we i…
Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero +2
We study the existence of pairwise stable allocations in matching markets with contracts and propose a domain restriction that guarantees their existence. Specifically, we define p…
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of…
Lattice operations for the stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we…
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it?…
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero, Jorge Oviedo
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implement…
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions a…
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships.…
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme +1
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable ma…
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guinazu, Noelia Juarez +2
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of s…
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market
Noelia Juarez, Pablo A. Neme, Jorge Oviedo
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuiti…