3 citations · 10 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers
A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer Utility
Kira Goldner, Taylor Lundy, Thodoris Tsilivis
Motivated by social services where consumers pay with non-transferable ordeals, we study mechanisms that maximize consumer utility for multiple unit-demand buyers and heterogeneous…
Knowing Who, Not How Much: Learning-Augmented Mechanisms for Consumer Utility Maximization
Kira Goldner, Divyarthi Mohan, Thodoris Tsilivis
We study consumer utility maximization in an online random-order model where strategic agents arrive sequentially. To circumvent strong impossibility results for utility maximizati…
From Welfare to Utility: Generalized Objectives in Budget-Feasible Procurement
Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Eldar Kerner +1
We study mechanism design for the budget-feasible procurement problem, a natural problem that arises when a buyer wants to procure goods or services from multiple strategic sellers…
Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation
Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner +2
Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the privat…
Multidimensional Bayesian Utility Maximization: Tight Approximations to Welfare
Kira Goldner, Taylor Lundy
We initiate the study of multidimensional Bayesian utility maximization, focusing on the unit-demand setting where values are i.i.d. across both items and buyers. The seminal resul…
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner +2
The celebrated model of auctions with interdependent valuations, introduced by Milgrom and Weber in 1982, has been studied almost exclusively under private signals $s_1, \ldots, s_…
Private Interdependent Valuations
Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Shuran Zheng
We consider the single-item interdependent value setting, where there is a monopolist, buyers, and each buyer has a private signal describing a piece of information about…
Non-Adaptive Matroid Prophet Inequalities
Shuchi Chawla, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin +1
We investigate non-adaptive algorithms for matroid prophet inequalities. Matroid prophet inequalities have been considered resolved since 2012 when [KW12] introduced thresholds tha…
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization
Yang Cai, Kira Goldner, Steven Ma +1
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller $…
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena +2
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary info…
When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase
Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract w…
Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition
Kira Goldner, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
We study auctions for carbon licenses, a policy tool used to control the social cost of pollution. Each identical license grants the right to produce a unit of pollution. Each buye…
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities
Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner +1
We study a new model of complementary valuations, which we call "proportional complementarities." In contrast to common models, such as hypergraphic valuations, in our model, we do…
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +2
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent has a private signal that captures her private information, and the valuation…
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Kira Goldner, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that…
Mechanism Design for Social Good
Rediet Abebe, Kira Goldner
Across various domains--such as health, education, and housing--improving societal welfare involves allocating resources, setting policies, targeting interventions, and regulating…
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +1
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valu…
Revenue Maximization with an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer
Shuchi Chawla, Kira Goldner, J. Benjamin Miller +1
Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have establis…