4 papers
Informational Effects in Conflict Escalation
Constantine Sorokin, Eyal Winter
We study a war of attrition in which each party chooses how far to escalate before conceding. If neither concedes before escalation reaches a random disaster threshold, both receiv…
The Benefits of Coarse Preferences
Joseph Y. Halpern, Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equi…
Optimal Collaterals in Multi-Enterprise Investment Networks
Moshe Babaioff, Yoav Kolumbus, Eyal Winter
We study a market of investments on networks, where each agent (vertex) can invest in any enterprise linked to her, and at the same time, raise capital for her firm's enterprise fr…
An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue
Moshe Haviv, Eyal Winter
We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter for a random fee in order to become premium customers.…