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20142025
most citedSequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark

3 citations · 16 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +3

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the on…

cs.GT2023

Constrained Phi-Equilibria

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to c…

cs.GT2022

Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria

Martino Bernasconi, Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has severa…

cs.GT2019★ 3 cited

Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces

Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò, Nicola Gatti

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a…

cs.GT2016★ 3 cited

Machine Learning Techniques for Stackelberg Security Games: a Survey

Giuseppe De Nittis, Francesco Trovò

The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on papers and works developed by the Team…

cs.GT2014

Truthful Learning Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities

Nicola Gatti, Alessandro Lazaric, Marco Rocco +1

Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertis…