7 citations · 15 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2020
Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many Mechanisms
Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos
We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms…
cs.GT2020
Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng
We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the \emph{aggregate} auction. We analyze this setting…