21 papers
Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-reve…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
Robust Aggregation of Calibrated Forecasts
Xinxiang Guo, Yingkai Li, Yifen Mu
Decision-makers often rely on multiple probabilistic forecasts that are individually calibrated but need not be fully informative. We develop a framework for aggregating such forec…
Screening for Choice Sets
Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately knows which actions or technologies are feasible and can disclose only a subset to a principal. Once disclosed, feasible op…
Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
Zhicheng Du, Yingkai Li, Boli Xu
A principal and agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unk…
Allocating Resources under Strategic Misrepresentation
Yingkai Li, Xiaoyun Qiu
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on…