6 papers
Strict Fairness at What Cost? Envy-Free Contracts with Subsidies
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work reveals a fairness-reve…
Algorithmic Fair Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
We initiate the algorithmic study of fair contract design. A principal assigns multiple tasks to heterogeneous agents and chooses task-level linear contracts; agents differ in cost…
The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization for Quadratic Polynomials
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
We prove that computing approximate stationary points of min-max optimization over the hypercube is PPAD-hard for quadratic polynomials. This holds even when the polynomials are mu…
The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization with Product Constraints
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni
We study the computational complexity of the problem of computing local min-max equilibria of games with a nonconvex-nonconcave utility function . From the work of Daskalakis, S…
Fair Team Contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li
A principal selects a team of agents for collaborating on a joint project. The principal aims to design a revenue-optimal contract that incentivizes the team of agents to exert cos…
Multi-Project Contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen +3
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each projec…