activity
20202023
most citedEnhanced Cyber-Physical Security Using Attack-resistant Cyber Nodes and Event-triggered Moving Target Defence

1 citations · 2 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

eess.SY2023★ 1 cited

Incentive-weighted Anomaly Detection for False Data Injection Attacks Against Smart Meter Load Profiles

Martin Higgins, Bruce Stephen, David Wallom

Spot pricing is often suggested as a method of increasing demand-side flexibility in electrical power load. However, few works have considered the vulnerability of spot pricing to…

eess.SY2022

Spatial-Temporal Anomaly Detection for Sensor Attacks in Autonomous Vehicles

Martin Higgins, Devki Jha, David Wallom

Time-of-flight (ToF) distance measurement devices such as ultrasonics, LiDAR and radar are widely used in autonomous vehicles for environmental perception, navigation and assisted…

eess.SY2022

Blending Data and Physics Against False Data Injection Attack: An Event-Triggered Moving Target Defence Approach

Wangkun Xu, Martin Higgins, Jianhong Wang +2

Fast and accurate detection of cyberattacks is a key element for a cyber-resilient power system. Recently, data-driven detectors and physics-based Moving Target Defences (MTD) have…

eess.SY2022

Cyber-Physical Risk Assessment for False Data Injection Attacks Considering Moving Target Defences

Martin Higgins, Wangkun Xu, Fei Teng +1

In this paper, we examine the factors that influence the success of false data injection (FDI) attacks in the context of both cyber and physical styles of reinforcement. Many works…

eess.SY2021

Topology Learning Aided False Data Injection Attack without Prior Topology Information

Martin Higgins, Jiawei Zhang, Ning Zhang +1

False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against powersystem state estimation are a growing concern for operators.Previously, most works on FDI attacks have been performedunder the assum…

eess.SY2020★ 1 cited

Enhanced Cyber-Physical Security Using Attack-resistant Cyber Nodes and Event-triggered Moving Target Defence

Martin Higgins, Keith Mayes, Fei Teng

This paper outlines a cyber-physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks. We demonstrate that it is feasible t…

eess.SY2020

Stealthy MTD Against Unsupervised Learning-based Blind FDI Attacks in Power Systems

Martin Higgins, Fei Teng, Thomas Parisini

This paper examines how moving target defences (MTD) implemented in power systems can be countered by unsupervised learning-based false data injection (FDI) attack and how MTD can…