deferred acceptance 1graph theory 1pareto inefficiency 1random markets 1stable matching 1trading cycles 1
From the 1 of 3 linked papers with an AI index.
3 papers
econ.TH2026
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The paper demonstrates that in large random matching markets, any stable matching—such as the student‑proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm—is almost surely Pareto‑inefficient, w…
math.PR2026
Travel Bans vs. Other Disease Mitigation Measures: A Mathematical Analysis
Christian Borgs, Karissa Huang, Geng Zhao
As the world grows increasingly connected, infectious disease transmission and outbreaks have become a pressing global concern for public health officials and policymakers. While p…
econ.TH2025
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…