From the 1 of 11 linked papers with an AI index.
11 papers
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The paper demonstrates that in large random matching markets, any stable matching—such as the student‑proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm—is almost surely Pareto‑inefficient, w…
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Pablo Neme
We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cove…
Justifiable Priority Violations
Josué Ortega, R. Pablo Arribillaga
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask…
Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a u…
What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga +1
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have…
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…