3 papers
cs.GT2025
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Aditya Aradhye, David Lagziel, Eilon Solan
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponent…
cs.GT2021
Computing Stackelberg Equilibrium with Memory in Sequential Games
Aditya Aradhye, Branislav Bošanský, Michael Hlaváček
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player…
cs.GT2020
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl +1
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current st…