1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Mechanism Design for Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Agents: A General Framework and the Revelation Principle
Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam
This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participating agents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). In particular, we consider…
Black-Box Strategies and Equilibrium for Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Players
Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam
The betweenness property of preference relations states that a probability mixture of two lotteries should lie between them in preference. It is a weakened form of the independence…
Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanisms
Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam
We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggregate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences can be increased over deterministic allocati…
Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences
Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam
We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to…